Ponderings on the "soul"

     When I was in college I read an interesting book called, "Whatever Happened to the Soul."  Some professor (probably Scott Daniels) referenced this text in class, and it sounded interesting enough that I bought it and read it.  Although there are a number of different essays in this book, the overarching thesis of the book is that the Platonic notion of the soul (what some might think to be the 'traditional' understanding of a soul that is separate from, but interacting with, the body) is, at present, scientifically and philosophically untenable (n.b. I use the term 'scientific' loosely as the editors of this book are a psychologist and a philosopher).  Rather, the authours argue, it makes more sense to speak of 'soulishness'.  Simply put, they mean that there is something that is definitive of a human being, a quality that is absent in all other forms of life, yet, this quality is inherently infleshed.  Thus, what they take issue with is the idea of a disembodied soul.  Theologically this would put a much greater emphasis on the Hebrew notion of the resurrection of the dead than on a belief in the immortality of the soul.  

   

      Recently I was reading a novel, "The Art of Fielding," which called to mind my college readings.  As a sort of eulogy, one of the characters in the novel says, "You told me once that a soul isn't something a person is born with but something that must be built, by effort and error, study and love.  And you did that with more dedication than most, that work of building a soul- not for your own benefit but for the benefit of those who knew you."  I have recently been thinking a lot about the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (whom I believe I also referenced in my last post).  In particular, I am interested in his claim that a person only gains subjectivity when (s)he becomes subject to an other.  Subjectivity is only available to subjects.  This is a very different idea than the modernist idea that subjectivity and autonomy are necessary correlates each of the other.   According to Kant, the only rational, and therefore moral decision, is the decision that is made autonomously.  Levinas, on the other hand, argues that it is only when one enters into a relationship as a subject to a sovereign that one truly becomes a human.  Levinas is particularly interested in inter-human relationships, and thus, given the prior definition of the soul as that which is becoming of humanity, one might argue that, for Levinas, subjectivity as subjecthood is 'the soul', or 'soulishness'.  

   

    I am very drawn to the idea that the 'soul' is something that must be built.  I am very drawn to the idea that the hard work of building a soul, of becoming human, ought to be something that is done for the benefit of those whom one knows.  While feminist thinkers (among others) like Valerie Saiving (also among others) remind us of the potential dangers of only focusing on the other to the detriment of the self, I tend to believe that selfishness is a greater issue than detrimental selflessness for most of us.  Thus, for many, the effort of building a soul, through error, study, and love, takes the form of living for another (an other).  The soul, thus built, offers forth true humanity by denying the possibility of perfect autonomy.  Contrary to Kant's philosophy, then, moral decisions are not made in a 'rational' vacuum, but in the actually lived, embodied, world.  The morality of a decision is based not on a universally valid 'law', but upon the interactions of one with another.  This understanding of moral philosophy helps us to understand the nature of humanity.  People can no longer claim to be a 'good person' while doing 'bad things' (Of course, one should keep in mind that the soul is built upon effort and error just as it is built upon study and love).  Rather, we need to recognize that we simply are what we do.  It is our actions that determine our humanity, our 'soul'.  When we disrespect others, we disrespect ourselves.  The face of the other serves as a mirror of either the destruction or juvenation of our 'souls'.  We cannot claim to love another while only demonstrating love for ourselves.  Neither can we hope to be fully human unless we recognize the humanity (even if only potential) of others.  The nature of the 'soul' depends on this: that we love our neighbours as ourselves.  

    

   Obviously a well-developed moral theory would need to account for more than merely the inter-human relationship, but that will have to wait for another time.  I mean... come on... this is only a blog...